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ABSTRACT
As wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been applied across
a spectrum of application domains, the problem of source
location privacy (SLP) has emerged as a significant issue,
particularly in security-critical situations. In the seminal
work on SLP, phantom routing was proposed as a viable
approach to address SLP. However, recent work has shown
some limitations of phantom routing such as poor perfor-
mance with multiple sources. In this paper, we propose
phantom walkabouts, a novel version and more general ver-
sion of phantom routing, which performs phantom routes
of variable lengths. Through extensive simulations we show
that phantom walkabouts provides high SLP levels with a
low message overhead and hence, low energy usage.
CCS Concepts
•Computer systems organization→ Embedded and cyber-
physical systems; Sensor networks;
Keywords
Source Location Privacy; Wireless Sensor Networks; Routing;
Phantom routing; Phantom walkabouts.
1. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a number of
tiny devices, known as sensor nodes or motes, that can sense
different attributes of the environment and use radio signals
to communicate among themselves. WSNs have enabled
the development of many novel applications, including asset
monitoring, target tracking and environment control [14]
among others, with low levels of intrusiveness. As they are
also expected to be deployed in safety and security-critical
systems, including military [1] and medical services, the
communication protocols used in the WSN must meet the
stringent security and privacy requirements.
Threats to privacy in monitoring applications can be con-
sidered along two dimensions: (i) content-based threats and
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(ii) context-based threats. Content-based privacy threats re-
late to use of the content of the messages broadcast by sensor
nodes, such as gaining the ability to read an eavesdropped
encrypted message. There has been much research address-
ing the issue of providing content privacy, e.g., SPINS [18],
with most efforts in this area focusing on the use of cryp-
tographic techniques. On the other hand, context-based
privacy threats focus on the context in which messages are
broadcast and how information can be observed or inferred by
attackers. Context is a multi-attribute concept that encom-
passes situational aspects of broadcast messages, including
environmental and temporal information.
It is often desirable for the source of sensed information
to be kept private in a WSN. For example, in a military
application, a soldier transmitting messages can uninten-
tionally disclose its location, even when encryption is used.
Another example is during the monitoring of endangered
species where poachers may be tempted to infer the location
of the animal to capture it. Real world examples include
monitoring badgers [4] and the WWF’s Wildlife Crime Tech-
nology Report1, both of which would likely benefit from SLP
being provided. In this paper, the context we focus on is
that of source location.
Techniques that protect this source location are said to
provide source location privacy (SLP). In each of the pre-
viously mentioned scenarios, it is important to ensure that
an attacker cannot find or deduce the location of the asset
being monitored, whether it is a soldier or an endangered
animal. A WSN setup to forward the information collected
about an asset would typically consist of the following: (i)
a dedicated node for data collection called a sink node, (ii)
node(s) involved in sending information about these assets
called source nodes, and (iii) many other nodes in the net-
work used to route/relay messages over multiple hops from
the sources to the sink. It has been shown that even a weak
attacker such as a distributed eavesdropping attacker can
backtrack along message paths through the network to find
the source node and capture the asset [9]. Thus, there is a
need to develop SLP-aware algorithms.
A number of techniques have been proposed to provide SLP,
such as phantom routing using random walks [9], delays [6],
dummy data sources [7, 15] and so forth. In general, the
objective can be informally stated as the provision of a
high level of source location privacy while spending as little
energy as possible. In the seminal work on SLP [9], the
phantom routing technique was proposed. Phantom routing
is a technique where a source initially sends a message along
1worldwildlife.org/projects/wildlife-crime-technology-project
a random walk (a.k.a. phantom route) of a certain length
(typically a few hops). When the message reaches a phantom
node at the end of the walk, the phantom node routes the
message towards the sink (e.g., by flooding). However, it
was recently shown that the phantom routing technique does
not scale well under realistic conditions with (i) multiple
sources, (ii) increased source rate and (iii) different network
configurations [5]. In this paper, we propose a novel, more
generalised technique called phantom walkabouts, of which
phantom routing is a specific instance. Phantom walkabouts
is essentially phantom routes of varying lengths. Through
extensive simulations, we show that phantom walkabouts
provides state-of-the-art levels of SLP, helping achieve trade-
offs between privacy and energy usage.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We propose phantom walkabouts, a novel and more
general technique than phantom routing, that help
achieve a better trade-off between SLP and energy.
• We show, via extensive simulations, the viability of
phantom walkabouts. For example, under certain pa-
rameterisation, phantom walkabouts achieves extremely
high SLP with acceptable message overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion 2 surveys related work in SLP and Section 3 presents
the models assumed. In Section 4 we present phantom walk-
about. The adopted system and simulation approach are
outlined in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results of the
experiments conducted. Section 7 concludes this paper with
a summary of contributions.
2. RELATED WORK
The SLP problem was first posed around 2004 in [16].
Since then, several techniques have been proposed to address
SLP. The solution spectrum spans from simple solutions
such as the sending of dummy messages [21, 25] to more
sophisticated techniques such as in [7, 12]. All of these
solutions however entail that a set of nodes is selected to send
dummy messages. This range from cyclic entrapment [15]
to (controlled) flooding of dummy messages [7, 12]. These
solutions also handle different types of attackers, though the
focus is on local attackers, as in this paper. Perhaps the most
significant disadvantage of the described SLP techniques is
the volume of messages broadcast to provide SLP. This leads
to increased energy consumption and an increased number
of collisions, both of which result in a decreased packet
delivery ratio. This means that a tradeoff between energy
expenditure and privacy must be made [8], making dummy
message schemes challenging for many large-scale networks.
However, works such as in [3, 6, 13, 19, 20] do not use
dummy messages. In particular, [17] and [9] proposed a
two-phase solution called phantom routing scheme (PRS).
The messages are sent on a directed random walk where the
message is either sent towards or away from a certain node
in the network, followed by a the chosen routing protocol. A
message from the source node would perform a walk through
the network to a location and the node would become a
phantom source node. PRS has received a lot of attention
in the literature. On the other hand, the weaknesses as
proposed by [22], [19] and [11] for poor SLP are due to the
directed random walk reusing the routing path and exposure
of direction information. In order to improve the random
walk quality, [23] proposed using location angles to construct
the random walk. On the other hand, [24] used a different
approach in GROW, by recording neighbours in a bloom
filter which informed the choice of the next node to be used in
the random walk. However, there is still scope to improve the
nodes that are allocated to take part in the directed random
walk. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to
better balance the trade-off between energy efficiency and
SLP. There are also a range of work on SLP to handle global
attackers, but these are outside the scope of the paper.
3. MODELS
In this section, we present the various models that underpin
this work.
3.1 Network Model
We assume a wireless sensor network to contain a set of
resource-constrained nodes that communicate using a wireless
radio. When a node senses the environment, it generates a
message and sends the message towards a dedicated node
called the sink. There are several potential routing algorithms
for message routing in WSNs. We assume all the nodes to be
static, i.e., the topology of the network remains the same and
the neighbourhoods of all the nodes remain the same over
the duration of the network. We do not assume that links
are bidirectional, i.e., links may disappear intermittently.
3.2 Attacker Model
We assume a patient adversary model, known as a distributed
eavesdropper, introduced in [9]. The attacker initially starts
at the sink and we assume the attacker is equipped with
the necessary devices to determine the direction a message
originated (such as directional antennas). When the attacker
overhears a new message, he will move to the location of the
immediate sender, i.e., the neighbour that last forwarded
the message. This is commensurate with the attacker model
used in [2, 5, 7, 8].
4. PHANTOM WALKABOUTS
In the section, we propose a novel SLP routing protocol,
termed as phantom walkabouts, which is a more generic ver-
sion of the so-called phantom routing strategy. Phantom
walkabouts is basically phantom routing with variable ran-
dom walk lengths, which we will show offer better trade-offs
than phantom routing. We first briefly explain the rationale
behind the protocol and we then explain the algorithms for
forming the short and long random walk, the biased long
random walk and the overall phantom walkabouts algorithm.
4.1 Overview
Figure 1a shows the typical scenario during an execution
of phantom routing where the source sends a message to
a phantom node which lies somewhere between itself and
the sink. When the phantom node floods the message to
the sink, the first movement of the attacker is towards the
phantom node. However, it would be beneficial to have the
first movements of the attacker to be away from the source,
as shown in Figure 1b. To achieve this, a longer random
walk can be used, where the length of the walk exceeds the
source-sink distance.
Although long random walk routing can potentially lead
to higher level of source location privacy, it also involves
Table 1: Commonly used notations
Notation Meaning
rwDir Message random walk direction
dir Message random walk direction set
newDir Message new random walk direction
hwalk Message random walk hop-count remaining
δ Message biased random walk direction
α Biased random walk factor
tt Flooding time taken
sp Phantom walkabouts safety period
Ms Short random walk message
Ml Long random walk message
a greater number of nodes for forwarding messages, thus
consuming more energy. In that sense, there is a trade-off to
be made between the level of SLP gained and the additional
amount of energy consumed or message overhead.
As such, we conjecture that phantom walkabouts with a
mix of short and long random walk will achieve a higher
level of SLP than phantom routing with a bounded message
overhead. We denote a phantom walkabouts parametrisation
by PW (s, l), where s, l denote the number of short and
long random walk respectively to be performed in a cycle.
PW (1, 1) denotes a repeating sequence of 1 short random
walk followed by 1 long random walk. Phantom routing with
short random walks is denoted by PW (1, 0) where there are
no long random walks, and vice versa for PW (0, 1). Later,
in this paper, we investigate the SLP levels, and associated
message overhead of PW (1, 0), PW (1, 1) and PW (0, 1).
Table 1 summarises the most commonly used notations in
the paper.
Source node
Phantom node
Flooding
Random walk
Attacker movement
Sink node
(a) Short random walk
Source node
Phantom node
Flooding
Random walk
Attacker movement
Sink node
(b) Long random walk
Figure 1: Short and long random walk routing examples
4.2 Short Random Walk Routing
Rather than divide node neighbours into two sets (as phan-
tom routing does) and thus limit the possible random walk
direction, we introduce short random walk routing algorithm
that always splits node neighbours into four sets, which in-
creases random walk directions, and hence improves short
random walk reliability. When the short random walk length
s is less than the source-sink distance, the short random
route is allocated using Algorithm 1 and described below:
• Each node maintains four sets for all its neighbours,
Sn, Ss, Sw and Se representing four different directions:
Figure 2: Neighbour division example
Algorithm 1 Short Random Walk
1: procedure ShorRandomWalk(msg, s)
2: NextLocation ← ⊥
3: msg.hwalk ← s
4: while msg.hwalk 6= 0 do
5: msg.dir ← ChooseOneSet(msg)
6: if msg.dir.h 6= ⊥ ∧msg.dir.v 6= ⊥ then
7: NextLocation ← ChooseOne(msg.dir)
8: msg.hwalk ← msg.hwalk − 1
9: msg.CurrentLocation ← NextLocation
10: ForwardMessage(msg.CurrentLocation)
11: Flooding()
north, south, west and east neighbours of a node it-
self. This partition can be achieved by landmark nodes
flooding messages during the deployment phase2. After
neighbour nodes partition, the message’s random walk
direction presents in two sets, one set for each dimen-
sion. The random walk direction has one of four moving
directions, i.e., dir = {h, v} where (h, v) ∈ {(Sw, Sn),
(Se, Sn), (Sw, Ss), (Se, Ss)}. For instance, as shown in
Figure 2, a source node randomly chooses Sw and Sn
directions, i.e., dir = {Sw, Sn}.
• At the beginning of random walk phase, a message
randomly chooses a walk direction rwDir ∈ dir and
always randomly chooses walk direction from dir during
the random walk phase.
• When a message travelled s hops (assume random walk
length is s), it has finished the random walk phase. The
message then flood throughout the network so that it
reaches the sink node.
4.3 Long Random Walk Routing
Long random walk routing is named as such because the
length l is larger than the source-sink distance. It is more
complex than short random walk routing because the message
may reach the borderline of the network and the border node
cannot forward the message to the previous selected direction.
In this case, we say that the random walk is blocked. If this
happens, the message may not continue to walk along with
the previous direction and a new direction is used for the
rest random walk. Here we describe a new algorithm for it
which is also shown in Algorithm 2.
• Similar to short random walk routing, each node main-
tains four sets for all its neighbours, Sn, Ss, Sw, Se.
Also the node classifies their neighbours into two sets
2Observe that this does not restrict the network topology to
be a grid, but rather that the nodes can be partitioned into
these 4 sets
Algorithm 2 Long Random Walk
1: procedure LongRandomWalk(msg, l)
2: NextLocation ← ⊥
3: msg.hwalk ← l
4: while msg.hwalk 6= 0 do
5: msg.dir ← ChooseOneSet(msg)
6: if msg.dir.h 6= ⊥ ∧msg.dir.v 6= ⊥ then
7: NextLocation ← ChooseOne(msg.dir)
8: else
9: msg.newDir ← GetCloserSinkSet()
10: if msg.newDir 6= ⊥ then
11: NextLocation ← ChooseOne(msg.newDir)
12: else if msg.newDir = ⊥ ∧msg.dir = ⊥ then
13: hwalk ← 0
14: break
15: else
16: NextLocation ← ChooseDirection(msg.dir)
17: msg.hwalk ← msg.hwalk − 1
18: msg.CurrentLocation ← NextLocation
19: ForwardMessage(msg.CurrentLocation)
20: Flooding()
by the node-sink distance. If its neighbour nodes have
larger node-sink distance than itself, the neighbour
nodes will be classified into the FurtherSinkSet. Oth-
erwise, they will be classified into the CloserSinkSet.
• Now the message holding rwDir is walking through the
network. If rwDir is empty, we believe the message is
blocked. In this case, dir becomes CloserSinkSet and
new direction newDir will be assigned to one in the
CloserSinkSet. In certain extreme situation when dir
is ∅, the long random walk terminates and the node
become the phantom node. Because we believe the
phantom node is farthest from the real source node and
ensures the safety of source node that its location will
be hard to track.
• Similar to short random walk routing, the flooding
phase will start once the long random walk ends.
4.4 Biased Long Random Walk Routing
A long random walk routing ensures that phantom nodes
are far away from the real source node. However, there is a
weakness that needs to be addressed for certain topologies.
Specifically, consider the topology where the source node lies
in the corner of a grid and the sink node in the middle area
of the network. As the source locates in the corner, messages
will be always transmitted towards the sink node. Owing to
the random nature of the walk, the long random walk may
“go through” the sink node. In this case, the attacker will
notice the message and will move towards the source node,
increasing the chance of a source capture.
To address this issue, we develop a biased long random
walk, for the specific topology so as to avoid the case where
the random walk goes close to the attacker. The biased long
random walk is described as follow and shown in Algorithm 3.
• The message firstly chooses the biased random walk
direction δ (follow horizontal direction H or vertical
direction V ), i.e., δ ∈ {H,V }. If chosen, the message
will continue use the selected biased direction until
random walk phase finish or reach the end of that
direction.
Algorithm 3 Biased Long Random Walk
1: procedure BiasedLongRandomWalk(msg, l)
2: NextLocation ← ⊥
3: biasedSet ← {H,V }
4: msg.hwalk ← l
5: msg.biasedDir ← ChooseOneDirection(biasedSet)
6: while msg.hwalk 6= 0 do
7: p ← GenerateRandomNumber(0, 1)
8: if p ≤ α then
9: NextLocation ← msg.biasedDir
10: if NextLocation = ⊥ then
11: NextLocation ← biasedSet \ {msg.biasedDir}
12: else
13: NextLocation ← biasedSet \ {msg.biasedDir}
14: if NextLocation = ⊥ then
15: hwalk ← 0
16: break
17: msg.hwalk ← msg.hwalk − 1
18: msg.CurrentLocation ← NextLocation
19: ForwardMessage(msg.CurrentLocation)
20: Flooding()
• A random value θ ∈ [0, 1] is generated. We set α
in our experiments to make sure a message has high
probability walking along δ. Normally the value of α is
often set larger than 0.5 but less than 1. For instance, if
α is set to 0.8, it indicates the message has nearly 80%
probability transmitting along the previous direction δ.
The node decides to send this message to the neighbour
node by following equation:
f(δ, θ, α) =
δ if θ ∈ [0, α]{H,V } \ {δ} otherwise (1)
• When δ is blocked, it indicates that the message reach
the end of this direction. Message will choose newDir ∈
{H,V }\{δ} to continue the random walk until random
walk finishes. If newDir is ∅, the random walk stops.
Then the flooding phase starts.
4.5 Phantom Walkabouts
In this section, we formalize the phantom walkabouts tech-
nique, which extends the phantom routing protocol by adopt-
ing variable lengths of phantom routing. When a source node
routes a message M using phantom walkabouts, a decision is
needed regarding whether M goes on a short or long random
walk route. The sequencing of messages looks like as follows:
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
· · ·
Therefore, we observe that the phantom walkabouts consists
of m messages on short random walk and n messages on long
random walk, before the cycle is repeated. Thus, PW (1, 1)
consists of an alternating sequence of short and long random
walks. The phantom walkabouts adopts all the techniques
described in Subsection 4.2, Subsection 4.3, Subsection 4.4.
The phantom walkabouts algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
Of course, various short and long interleaving are possible,
which is part of our future work.
Algorithm 4 Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure PhantomWalkabouts(msg, s, l, PW (m,n))
2: m′, n′ ← m,n
3: while True do
4: if m′ > 0 then
5: GenerateMessage()
6: ShortRandomWalk(msg, s)
7: m′ ← m′ − 1
8: else if m′ = 0 ∧ n′ > 0 then
9: GenerateMessage()
10: BiasedLongRandomWalk(msg, l)
11: n′ ← n′ − 1
12: else
13: m′, n′ ← m,n
4.6 Problem Statement
The problem we address is: Given a source node, a sink, a pair
(s, l) for the short and long random walks length, analyse the
impact on SLP and associated message overhead of various
parameterisation on phantom walkabouts. The analysis will
capture the trade-offs that can be made regarding levels of
SLP and message overhead.
5. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we describe the simulation environment, source
selection, attacker model and safety period calculation that
were used to generate the results presented in Section 6.
5.1 Simulator and Network Configuration
The TOSSIM (V2.1.2) simulation environment was used in
all experiments [10]. TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator
capable of accurately modelling sensor nodes and the modes
of communications between them.
A square grid network layout of size n × n was used in
all experiments, with n ∈ {11, 15, 21, 25}, i.e., networks
with 121, 225, 441 and 625 nodes respectively. The node
neighbourhoods were generating using an ideal radio model
where each node is connected to their north, south, east and
west neighbour (if present). Nodes were located 4.5 meters
apart. Noise models were created using the first 1000 lines
of meyer-heavy.txt3. All the nodes are stationary.
Multiple source nodes generated messages and a single
sink node collected messages. The set of experiments for
each network size were performed with the source node(s) in
the corner, and the sink in the centre in the network. The
rate at which messages from the real sources was generated
was set to be either 1, 2, 4 and 8 messages per second. The
source period was normalised with respect to the number of
sources so that any configuration will have the same overall
message rate. At least 500 repeats were performed for each
combination of source location and parameters.
5.2 Source Selection
The three source positions we use in our simulations are
shown in Figure 3. The reason why the sources are clustered
together is because we envision providing SLP for several
sensors detecting an asset. Such configurations have previ-
ously been shown to provide poor performance [5], hence our
focus on trying to provide SLP for this degenarate case.
3meyer-heavy.txt is a noise sample file provided with
TOSSIM.
(a) one source (b) two sources (c) three sources
Figure 3: Network Layouts with Varying Number of Sources
5.3 Safety Period
A metric called safety period (which we call time-to-capture
from here) was introduced in [9] which is the number of
messages sent before an attacker captures the source. The
higher the time-to-capture is, the higher the source location
privacy level. Using the time-to-capture metric means that
simulation runtime is unbounded and potentially very large.
We thus use an alternative, but analogous, definition for
safety period : for each network size, source rate and config-
uration, we obtain the time-to-capture when protectionless
flooding is used as the routing protocol. Flooding is used
as it has been argued to provide the least SLP level, hence
any SLP improvement is due to the SLP-aware technique [9].
The safety period is then obtained by increasing this value
to account for the attacker potentially making bad moves.
Thus, we calculate the safety period sp as the following,
where tt is the time-to-capture for protectionless flooding.
This definitition is commensurate with [7, 8], but uses a
different multiplicative factor due to the difference in the
type of SLP technique being used. Intuitively, the safety
period captures the time period during which the asset will
be at the same location.
sp = 1.3× tt (2)
5.4 Simulation and Parameter Setup
An experiment is made of a single execution of the simulation
environment using a specified protocol configuration, network
size and safety period. An experiment terminated when any
source node had been captured by an attacker during the
safety period or the safety period had expired. We will anal-
yse two metrics calculated from the simulation experiments
which are now described. Message sent is defined as the
number of messages sent from each source during the experi-
ment, the final result is obtained by averaging the number
of messages sent over all repeats for a specific parameter
combination. We also define a metric called capture ratio
which is the number of experiments ending in a capture di-
vided by the total number of repeats for a specific parameter
combination.
In Subsection 4.4, we introduced parameter α used to
implement biased random walk. The larger the value of
α is, the bigger is the chance that the phantom walk will
avoid walking close to the sink. In the simulation, we set
this value to 0.9. When choosing the length of the long and
short random walks, a variety of parameter combinations
were considered. Our experiments set the short random
walk series S = {2, 3, . . . , 0.5× ssd}, and long random walk
series L = {2 + ssd, . . . , 1.5 × ssd}, where ssd is the sink
source distance. The phantom walkabouts combines the
short and long random walks such that the following length
combinations were used: Si × Li.
6. RESULTS
6.1 PW(1,0): SLP using Short Random Walks
SLP: In this section, we first establish the base case against
which subsequent improvements will be evaluated. In pre-
vious works on phantom routing, the length of the random
walk has typically been small, less than the source to sink
distance, which can be represented as PW (1, 0), showing the
generality of our framework. Figure 4a contains the results
for phantom routing. Two important observations are made:
• The level of SLP increases (i.e., capture ratio decreases)
with increasing message rate. This is counter intuitive
in the sense that it can be expected that the capture
ratio to be higher as more messages are sent by the
nodes and can be captured by the attacker. However,
the higher number of messages lead to a much lower
safety period, meaning that it is difficult for an attacker
to capture the source within the safety period.
• The level of SLP increases with increasing number of
sources, for similar reasons as earlier.
Messages: A high level of SLP can be provided albeit at the
expense of a high number of messages (hence, high energy
usage). Thus, there is a trade-off to be made between the
level of SLP provided and the number of messages transmit-
ted [8]. In Figure 5a, we observe that the number of messages
increases with increasing network size. It can also be ob-
served that the number of messages transmitted is similar
at various message rates. However, the number of messages
transmitted gets smaller with increasing number of sources.
This is due to the fact that the smaller safety period limits
the number of messages that can be transmitted.
6.2 PW(1,1): SLP using Alternating Short and
Long Random Walks
As has been shown, phantom routing with smaller random
walk yields lower SLP levels but with better message com-
plexity while phantom routing with longer random walks
yield much better SLP with a higher message overhead. To
try and achieve a trade-off between those two factors, we
consider the case where a short and a long random walk is
chosen alternately, yielding what we have termed as phantom
walkabouts.
As can be observed from Figures 4a and 4b, alternating
between a short and a long random walk in phantom walk-
abouts yields, in general, a higher level of SLP than when
using short random walks during phantom routing, especially
for the larger-sized networks. We conjecture that this phe-
nomenon happens due to the fact that the time taken for the
message to reach the attacker from a long random walk is
comparable to the time taken when time period of message
generation and the message reaching an attacker using a
short random walk, i.e., due to the longer time for a message
to reach an attacker through the longer random walk, an at-
tacker may see consecutive messages through shorter random
walks. However, this is an area for further investigation.
Further, this improvement comes about with the expected
additional message overhead (see Figures 5a and 5b) from
the base case. Comparing with the case of having only long
random walks during phantom routing, we observe that there
is the expected decrease in SLP levels (Figures 4c and 4b)
but also in message overheads (Figures 5c and 5b).
6.3 PW(0,1): SLP using Long Random Walks
As explained earlier in Figure 1, we hypothesised that a
short random walk will initially drag the attacker towards
the source while a longer random walk will drag the attacker
away from the source, thereby possibly increasing the SLP
levels but also energy usage. In this section, we seek to
determine whether the hypotheses hold.
As can be observed from Figures 4a and 4c, the level of
SLP provided with a longer random walk is much higher
than that with a shorter random walk, thereby corroborating
our hypothesis. On the other hand, though the number of
messages sent with long random walks is greater than with
short random walks (see Figures 5a and 5c), the increase is
only nominal, around 15%, while the drop in capture ratio
is around a factor of 40. This shows that phantom routing,
with a long random walk, offers a much higher level of SLP
at the expense of a small increase in message transmissions
(i.e., energy expenditure).
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel technique called
phantom walkabouts, which extends the phantom routing, to
provide a better level of SLP but at lower additional message
overhead. Through simulations, we have shown that phantom
walkabouts provide much better levels of SLP at certain
parameterisation, albeit at only a small message overhead
over phantom routing, than phantom routing (PW(1,0)).
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